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Following the revolution in Tunisia, we are now observing history taking place in another Arab nation - Egypt. Mubarak's time clock is ticking away and he just might be gone in a few days. But an interesting question has arisen in foreign policy circles: did the Wikileaks diplomatic cables exposure facilitate what's going on in Arabia? Tom Malinowski of Foreign Policy asks that question:

I asked our experts at Human Rights Watch to canvass their sources in the country, and the consensus was that while Tunisians didn't need American diplomats to tell them how bad their government was, the cables did have an impact. The candid appraisal of Ben Ali by U.S. diplomats showed Tunisians that the rottenness of the regime was obvious not just to them but to the whole world -- and that it was a source of shame for Tunisia on an international stage. The cables also contradicted the prevailing view among Tunisians that Washington would back Ben Ali to the bloody end, giving them added impetus to take to the streets. They further delegitimized the Tunisian leader and boosted the morale of his opponents at a pivotal moment in the drama that unfolded over the last few weeks.

He continues,

In reality, no amount of "high-level private candor" was going to convince Ben Ali of Tunisia that allowing free speech or free elections was in his interest, because it plainly wasn't (even if it was very much in the interest of Tunisia as a whole) -- and the same is true for President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and others like him. Authoritarian rulers do not ease repression or agree to checks on their powers because foreign officials convince them it is a good idea in a private meeting. Such rulers make political concessions when it is necessary to retain the support of key actors in their societies -- from the general population to the security services to economic and political elites.

But depending on the circumstances, public, external pressure really can influence the calculations of these domestic actors. It can help delegitimize rulers in the eyes of their people; it can cause elites to question whether tying themselves to their leader's policies serves their interests; it can encourage and amplify domestic voices calling for change. Precisely because it can be consequential, it is hard to bring such pressure to bear without causing diplomatic friction. The alternative, however, is to be inconsequential.

You can see the friction from this account in the NY Times where Mubarak addresses the U.S. helping facilitate reform in the region:

In the past, Mr. Mubarak has thrown the example of Iran in the face of American officials -- perhaps as a warning not to press him too hard. In 2009, just before Mr. Mubarak came to Washington, the American ambassador to Cairo at the time, Margaret Scobey, noted in a cable to the State Department, "We have heard him lament the results of earlier U.S. efforts to encourage reform in the Islamic world."

"Wherever he has seen these U.S. efforts, he can point to the chaos and loss of stability that ensued," said the cable, one of a trove collected by WikiLeaks. "In addition to Iraq, he also reminds us that he warned against Palestinian elections in 2006 that brought Hamas (Iran) to his doorstep."

He then gets to the heart of the problem when dealing with autocrats that might be doing our bidding:

If you were a State Department official, and Hillary Clinton asked you every day: "What will the weather be like tomorrow?" and gave you points that you could cash in for career advancement every time you got the answer right, the safest strategy would be to answer that the weather tomorrow will be the same as the weather today. Likewise, on any given Sunday, the safest approach to engaging most of the world's dictatorships is to assume that they will be governed in exactly the same way on Monday, and base policy on that assumption. Why risk diplomatic relationships -- and one's own reputation as a prognosticator -- on strategies for promoting change that are not likely to work before you move on to your next diplomatic post?

It would be rational, for example, for American diplomats to believe that the revolution in Tunisia is unlikely to spur similarly successful popular movements in other authoritarian Arab countries, such as Egypt and Algeria. But by the same token, it would have been rational for them to believe just a month ago that no such revolution was possible in Tunisia. Or to discount the likelihood that the people of Kyrgyzstan would overthrow their corrupt government just weeks before it happened last year. Or to dismiss as a pipe dream that the mighty Soviet Union would fall, and that the powerless Baltic nations would become independent, democratic states, just a year before it happened. If we bet on the stability of authoritarian states, we will be right most of the time, but wrong at the crucial time.

Wanna bet that Mubarak of Egypt is, in fact, gone in a few days?

Historic times, that's for sure. And Wikileaks very well may have played a large role:

The people of Tunisia shouldn't have had to wait for Wikileaks to learn that the U.S. saw their country just as they did. It's time that the gulf between what American diplomats know and what they say got smaller.

And this report, from Al-Jazeera English, captures the spirit in the street, as well as the perspective from the younger generation:

And finally, make sure to keep checking into the NY Times blog posts for updates on the situation on the ground.

Post-script (amazing visuals, slightly sappy music):

Post-post-script:

This testimonial by an Egyptian at a demonstration in London is very powerful:

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